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 Illusionism treats the almost universally held belief in our ability to make free choices as an erroneous, though beneficent, idea.​[1]​ According to this view, it is sadly true, though virtually impossible to believe, that none of a person’s choices are avoidable and ‘up to him’: any claim to the effect that they are being naïveté or, in the case of those who know better, pretense.  Indeed, the implications of this skepticism are so disturbing, pace Spinoza, that it must not be allowed to see the light of intellectual day, confined to the nether regions of consciousness.  Even those who have ‘done the philosophy’ and disabused themselves here should nevertheless (somehow) continue believing in free will, lest they come to regard our lives as meaningless, spreading despair and social upheaval.  Thus, the “Illusionists” who propound this view are themselves circumspect.  
But is escaping the (putative) truth really possible here?  Could a disabused philosopher ever return to something like his former intellectual innocence?  Self-deception may not be possible; but would an attempt at it reveal anything significant about choice formation?  If one were to try to regain one’s illusion, what would one realize?  I shall argue here that one would reflectively discover precisely the opposite of what the Illusionists contend- that there are indeed free choices.  Let us begin by considering the inconsistency that supposedly entails the illusion of free will.
Philosophy
The Problem of Freedom and Determinism (PFD) may be cast as the following “inconsistent triad” (IT): three propositions only 2 of which could be true:
1.	We make free choices: our wills are avoidable, brought about through self-control alone, and rational.​[2]​
2.	Determinism is true: all events are the necessary outcomes of processes according to the Laws of Nature.
3.	If Determinism is true, then our choices are unavoidable and not ‘up to us’, ultimately being caused by forces beyond our control (if not irrational).
To show that Illusionism is untenable, we shall first describe a hypothetical attempt at philosophizing here: the discovery of IT amongst one’s beliefs and subsequent (unsuccessful) attempt to render them consistent.  Our description will recapitulate the history of the PFD as seen by the Illusionist.  The arguments involved will only be sketched, given in enough detail to provide a sense of the dialectical crisis prompting the notion that IT entails self-deception.  The point is not to conclusively disprove the views considered, but only to reveal the doxastic attitude of someone who thinks that he has good reasons to reject them in toto.  We shall then be in a position to see what it would be like to pretend to believe in free choices, which, according to the Illusionist, is all one can do by way of resolving IT.
Hard Determinism (HD)- rejecting 1 of IT- is decidedly not the default position of the unreflective or even philosophers.  It is typically arrived at only after the realization of the IT and then usually only as a last resort, the alternatives seeming decisively refuted.​[3]​  So Phil, our hypothetical philosopher, like everyone else, (including the Illusionist himself) intuitively believes that he makes free choices. That is, he thinks his choices are ‘up to him’: dependent upon him, so that it makes sense to hold him responsible and reward/punish him for his willingness to act in various ways, those actions themselves, and at least some of their effects, including, most importantly, aspects of his own character. He does not believe that his choices are unavoidable, the inevitable outcomes of natural processes the origins of which were well beyond his control.  Having chosen, he would reflectively maintain, if pressed, not only that he alone controlled the making of his choice, but that he could have chosen otherwise, even though he has good reasons for what he is (now) willing to do.  In short, Phil believes that he himself rationally makes his choices while being able to (rationally) make others.  Projecting, he thinks that other persons do the same thing in forming their wills. 
But Phil, being scientifically literate, also has reasons to believe in a corollary of Determinism: according to which his choices are the effects of the law governed workings of a neural mechanism (located in his pre-frontal cortex) initiated ultimately by events that occurred long before his birth. It doesn’t take much additional ratiocination for him to realize that if such an account is true, his choices are not unavoidable and not solely up to him. Once the events of which they are the (approximate) effects occurred, they were inevitable. And, what’s worse, one doesn’t really make one’s choices. They are made for one by (the neural correlates of) one’s beliefs and desires, the motives to which they are nomically related. That is to say, his choices are not dependent upon him, but states of mind/brain of which he is only the subject.  He appears more like an executive who forms a committee to make recommendations, then lets the loudest voices make the decisions for him.  What we want here is an agent who chooses on the basis of his beliefs and desires, rather than having them doing all the work.
Phil realizes at this point that the IT is a tangle in his web of beliefs. To remove it, he hesitatingly embraces Hard Determinism, as that position, unlike the others, is consistent with his understanding of empirical science as well as his pre-philosophical intuition regarding what it means to freely choose.  Let’s see, he says to himself, if I can live without believing in free will. He sees right off, however, that his religious beliefs no longer make any sense, in so far as they are based on the expectation of a divine judge eternally rewarding/punishing himself and his fellows. Nor in the here and now does it make sense for him to hold himself and others responsible; his sense that we are praiseworthy/blameworthy disappears.  He loses his own pride and his respect for others for this reason and even begins to doubt the existence of friendships and love.  When he find himself withholding praise for those close to him, he finally realizes that it’s more than he can psychologically bear, abandoning so much of what he holds dear on philosophical principle.  (He later discovers that others who have tried being one endure/d the same struggle and concludes that the enormous difficulty here is probably part of what Sartre meant when he said that we are condemned to be free.) Phil realizes that he’s not cut out to be a Hard Determinist and takes the immense impracticality of this position as a good reason for considering it false.​[4]​ 
His next step, then, is to reject 2, embracing Indeterminism (ID).​[5]​ He, thus, decides to disbelieve that his choices are the necessary effects of prior events. I find myself inclined to choose various things, he tell himself, but I no longer think that my choices are caused by my beliefs and desires, nor other (temporally distant) events.  Our choices, alone in Nature, occur without causes; the efforts preceding them being necessary, but not sufficient, to ‘make up our minds’. But now Phil finds himself staring straight at the “Mind Objection” to EID: undetermined choices would be not so much free as arbitrary, nay lucky. There’s no explanation for them; they happen ‘by chance’- even if an effort of will is required in those instances where one is indecisive for being of ‘two minds’.   Simply rejecting Determinism, then, does not justify his (intuitive) belief in free will. Avoidable, but undetermined choices would not yet be free.​[6]​ 
In response, Phil decides to consider Agent Causalism (AC) according to which persons themselves cause their choices, rather than events of which they are (merely) subjects.​[7]​ Despite the fact that this variant entails self-control of the sort required for making free choices, it is quickly dismissed by him for being unscientific.  No right-minded thinker, aware of the findings of neurophysiology, according to which neural events are the only relata of the causal nexus, would countenance this medieval notion.  An adequate account of free choice, he believes, should be consistent with this principle.​[8]​     
Phil is left, then, to size up the merits and demerits of Soft Determinism (SD).  Citing Hobbes, Harry Frankfurt, Susan Wolf and a long list of other free will theorists (including this author), he begins by conceding that it seems possible to freely obey a law: should you want to obey it and if that very want initiates your choice to do so, there is, then, a good reason to regard it as free: the lesson of so-called “Frankfurt” cases.​[9]​  Granted, if there is a Law of Nature to the effect that a choice of said type follows upon a want of said type, no other choice could be made.  But there is no coercion, compulsion, intimidation, or fear at work here- causes typically thought to interfere with choosing, as noted long ago by Hobbes.  It would not have been made under duress.  A want is ordinarily taken to be a part of one’s psyche; it may even have been reflectively granted approval.  Why should the effects of such a state of mind be thought of as negating one’s freedom simply for being regular?  In fact, as Wolf pointedly asks, why would anyone want to be able to act contrary to his own wants?  A choice made sans freedom would be caused by a state usually eschewed and/or whose typical stimulus is avoided. 
Phil eventually becomes disenchanted, however, with this redefining of a free choice. He still thinks of himself, should his choices be determined, as like the above “executive,” whose decisions are made for him. His choices would then depend upon his past- not him; what’s worse, they originate in events over which he had no control. He begins to realize that a true free choice would be ‘up to him’ and only him. To accept SD you must first identify with your state of mind at the moment of a choice, the beliefs and desires then operative.​[10]​ Then you must overlook or downplay the significance of the fact that those beliefs and desires have causes in the distant past, satisfying yourself that you are at least one of the causes of that choice (in virtue of being the subject of those states that proximately cause it). Perhaps this account is good enough for all practical purposes. But it fall far short of entailing ‘real’ responsibility: Phil simply can’t get over the idea that making free choices means being their sole cause as well as always being able to choose more than one thing. 
Self-deception
Now what?  Neither SD nor EID entails that our choices are up to us; AC is unscientific.  Further HD proved to be psychologically impossible.  IT has proven ineradicable.  There is not, it appears, a tenable position for (poor) Phil to adopt regarding the nature and existence of free choices.  It is at this point that the Illusionist would offer advice along the following lines.  “You cannot be a Hard Determinist; yet you know both alternatives are false.  Additional philosophizing would be unprofitable: do not think that you are the first thinker to find yourself in this quandary.  Thus, you must pretend to believe in free choices, given the unthinkable consequences of denying their existence.  That is to say, you have no (practical) choice but to engage in self-deception here, somehow making yourself countenance a phenomenon that you now know does is unreal.”
  Is self-deception possible?​[11]​  Could someone believe what he knows to be false?  Putative examples of it are given- but are they cogent?  One wants to avoid the unpleasant thoughts associated with a certain proposition- a “harsh” truth, as they say- so one ‘puts it out of one’s mind’ in favor of its opposite.  Summer vacation ends next week; I don’t want to go back to school/work.  Thus, I avoid talk of Labor Day, back-to-school sales, faculty/student orientation, and the like.  I even tell myself that there is a lot of summer left.  But am I truly deceiving myself?  Do I really think that the daily grind is not (once again) imminent?  Wouldn’t it be more accurate to say that I am simply refusing to acknowledge, to myself and others should they inquire, the truth?  Similarly, if I am convinced of the truth of HD, if my research has revealed the only alternatives to it to be false, how could I ever hope to persuade myself that I am not an adherent of that doctrine?  Is not adopting either of these views psychologically precluded until such time as new evidence in favor of one of them arrives?  Granted that I can dissemble should the subject of free will come up; but there is no hiding from myself, as Descartes would put it, the contents of my own mind regarding this (or any other) subject.  Why not, then, further pursue philosophy, searching for new reasons for and against the various positions?  What reason has arisen for aborting that project, beyond inconclusive answers to the questions they entailed?  As Thomas Reid noted, free will skepticism entails skepticism in general.  So should all other philosophical projects be abandoned for lack of solutions?  The Illusionist is in the awkward position of having to philosophize to defend his position having declared that it is futile for others to do likewise. 
Should these questions not admit of answers favorable to the possibility of self-deception, the Illusionist’s admonition would be futile.  But, for the sake of rendering Illusionism incoherent, I am prepared to concede that such answers are defensible.  Let us see then what an attempt at self-deception regarding free choices would be like.  Phil must pretend to believe that he and others make free choices.  But, at this stage in the dialectic, it is no longer possible for him to believe in free choices simpliciter.  What the Illusionist perhaps fails to notice here is that Phil must choose between the soft deterministic and indeterministic notions thereof.  That is to say, Phil must pretend to be either a Soft Determinist or (some type of) an Indeterminist.  Should he opt for the former he will suppress his concerns over the origination of his choices as well as their avoidability.  Should he take the latter route he will put the Mind objection out of his mind or abandon his scientific scruples.  But choose he must- and it is at this point that the incoherency in Illusionism begins to show.  For, given his earlier rejection of both of these alternatives, Phil would possess the liberty of indifference in making this choice.  That is to say, since both appeared false, neither would be any more intellectually attractive than the other, capable of causing him to choose one over the other.  He, then, could choose either one and would have to cause himself to make the selection.  That is, having chosen one over the other, the only possible explanation would be an exercise of self-control: the power to determine oneself the contents of one’s will.​[12]​
Phil must “adopt” one, according to the Illusionist, but it doesn’t seem to matter which one it is, as long as he can pretend that it is true.  He is like a sick person who needs to eat, but has no appetite.  Finding the foods offered him unpalatable, he must force himself to consume one of the available dishes.  Phil is now in the same state of mind regarding certain intellectual fare: so if he does manage to end up pretending to be a theorist of one the above stripes, it could only be because he caused himself to wear their colors.  No other explanation would be in the offing, since, again, the view he would be “holding” would have been (and presumably at some level of consciousness still is) unattractive.  That is, if Phil is capable of deceiving himself in the way presupposed by the Illusionist, then he must have (at least a measure of) self-control of the sort propounded by Agent Causalists: being able to ‘get beyond’ his indifference to make up his mind.  His choice here would be completely up to him, then, in the sense that it would have no sufficient condition besides the exercise of his self-control.  Though, it should be added, it would not be without justification, as there were reasons in favor of each position, albeit inconclusive ones.  That is, Phil would be able to defend his “choice” to himself and others by appealing to the very same considerations that attracted him to that position in the first place, pretending that they are conclusive.   
I am supposing that in the case where a strong desire is present (along with corresponding beliefs about the attainability of its object) someone could maintain that it is ontologically profligate to posit the person involved as the cause of the willingness to satisfy it, as opponents of Agent Causalists typically do.  But here nothing but Phil himself could bring about the choice.  Were he to end up pretending to be, say, a Soft Determinist, as well as remaining so deceived, it could only be because he caused himself to enter that (hitherto apparently false) state of mind, concealing his earlier doubts concerning its veracity.  To repeat, his self-deception could not be the result of a prior attraction to the truthfulness of that view: had it appeared that way there would be no pretense on his part.  
In summary, Illusionism is the thesis that HD is true combined with the admonition to shun it for its pernicious implications.  The required self-deception, however, would entail making a free choice between SD and EID/AC, falsifying HD and, thus, Illusionism itself.  Faced with the incoherency of his position, the Illusionist could beat a hasty retreat to straightforward HD.  But, unless he can show how making the above choice with the liberty of indifference would not be solely dependent upon the party involved, he must desist from his admonition. 
So does Phil possess the liberty of indifference in making his choice?    Or perhaps is there no choice to be made here: the necessary illusion being just ‘in place’ and consisting of elements of both EID/AC and SD, the former bolstering judgments of ‘real responsibility’ the latter lending credence to lesser, but more practical, concerns?  Such is (the gist of) the position held by the leading Illusionist, Saul Smilansky.​[13]​ 
Aside from the fact that EID/AC and SD are contradictory, which Smilansky concedes, there is the further issue of how to distinguish someone like disillusioned Phil from those who are philosophically naïve.  Assuming that HD is not an option for the latter, a Phil would ‘know better’.  Thus, it seems as if he must choose between HD and the amalgamation of SD and EID/AC that Smilansky calls the “Fundamental Dualism (FD).” (Further, he must select from amongst the conflicting elements of FD, to suit his current purposes, mirroring Phil above.  He cannot merely adopt the first philosophy that comes to mind, given that EID/AC is unsuitable in situations where SD applies and vice-versa.)  How, then, is he to regain his naïveté, given that he has come to accept HD, despite his reluctance to abandon FD: an apparent truth being pitted here against (what could serve as a paradigm of) an unclear and indistinct idea?   Having awakened himself from his dogmatic slumber, as Smilansky would have it, he could not lose sight of the truth here through any initiative but his own.  Even an alien force trying to remove it from his purview would now require his assent, having been ‘found out’.  Further, just as in the above scenario, he would have the liberty of indifference, only this time of the sort Descartes discussed: being able to withdraw his assent to an apparent truth by obscuring it (here by its horrible implications), facilitating choosing the obscure.  That is, to pretend to believe in FD, Phil, who can adopt HD because he has, at least hesitatingly, must be able to distort it so as to “affirm” the alternative.  His disillusionment would entail the liberty of indifference, again the choice being up to him, contra the skeptical aspect of Illusionism.​[14]​    
Conclusion
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